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**China’s engagement in Latin America is high now and its zero sum- even if US engagement is happening now, China’s influence is overpowering now**

**Rosenthal, 9/11** – political consultant and writer who is currently interning at The Center for Security Policy in Washington DC (Terence, 2013, “China’s Pivot to Latin America”, Global Balita, http://globalbalita.com/2013/09/11/chinas-pivot-to-latin-america/)//VP

The quest for global naval power runs parallel to competition for control of markets in Latin America.. The two largest world economies, the United States, and China are vying for control of these markets. China has an enormous population of approximately 1.3 billion people but is only able to use a very small percentage of its land mass. Its’ consumer market is the wealthiest it has been in modern times. China desires access to key resources such as petroleum, coal, iron, uranium, as well as agricultural products. Latin America is in high global demand, with 500 million people, and a $3trillion market. In its quest to be Latin America’s foremost business partner, China has risen out of ambiguity to become one of the top three exporters, sometimes surpassing the United States in countries like Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Chile, and Brazil. China has sought to be the prime lender in Latin America, loaning $110 billion dollars thus exceeding the World Bank’s contribution for the past two years. Some of China’s other most noteworthy loans include $28 billion to Venezuela, $10.2 billion to the Argentine debt swap, and 10 billion to Brazilian oil company, Petrobras. China wishes to benefit from developing infrastructure, ports, roads and rail systems in Latin America. In Nicaragua, China is planning the start of a canal bigger than the Panama Canal, facilitating passage to larger container ships than the Panama Canal is now able to handle. In Panama, China controls the leases at both ends of the Panama Canal and is in the process of widening the Canal in order to accommodate larger vessels. This constitutes excellent strategic positioning for China, giving them virtual control over two major passageways. Though a huge amount of the world’s trade transits the Panama Canal, the United States remains its biggest user. China’s economic relations in the Caribbean are also growing by leaps and bounds. Consider a $2.6 billion resort, among a gaggle of Chinese owned hotels and casinos being built by the Chinese in the Bahamas, 80 miles off the U.S. coast. Or Complant, a Chinese company, investing millions of dollars in Jamaica’s sugar industry. The Bahamas and Jamaica are great strategic places for the Chinese to invest due to their close proximity to the U.S., as well as in Cuba, with whom they already have solid military, diplomatic and commercial relations. In recent years, China has embarked on a well-planned pivot to Latin America, focusing on a multifaceted military approach. In terms of soft military power, the Chinese naval hospital, Peace Ark has sailed the Caribbean offering medical and military services, similar to America’s USNS Comfort, but, with the addition of military council. China conducts military exchange and arm sales with Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. In Argentina, the Chinese are providing technological assistance with aircraft and helicopters and in Brazil with civilian and military operations. In addition, specific attention is being paid to Venezuela as a launching pad for military and diplomatic influence in South America.

Exclusive Chinese action changes the balance of power in Venezuela- means US influence trades off

Elton, 10 (8/19/2010, Doug, “What would happen if Chavez cut off the US from Venezuelan oil?” http://www.helium.com/items/1926791-chavez-cut-off-the-us-from-venezuelan-oil-china-benefits)//VP

The international game of politics often plays like dominos. Columbia recently accused Venezuela of harboring rebels and this in turn lead Chavez to comment on oil exports to the U.S. If the dominos had fallen, a fourth country would have been the most likely to benefit in the long-term. China is predicted to overcome the U.S. economy one day. Its rapid industrialization equals a need for oil. Venezuela is aware of this and has been keen to advance the relationship between the two countries. At present, exporting oil to the U.S. allows Venezuela leverage when dealing with the Chinese. The greater the demand, the more control favors the distributor. Take the U.S. out of the equation and Venezuela will be desperate to sell oil to the Chinese. It’s the difference of coming to the feast a beggar or a king for Venezuela, but for the U.S. it has a far greater consequence. As the economic playing field levels, China is eager to catch up to the U.S. in the race to be the world’s superpower. Environmental concerns aside, U.S. consumption of oil gives it control over the market. Essentially, if the U.S. uses more of it, then China has less of it. It’s a strange advantage, but an advantage nonetheless. If Venezuelan oil is exported exclusively to China, the advantage is lost. This may have little impact at first, but as China attempts to surpass the U.S. this small measure could fuel global change.

**Chinese influence controls every existential scenario for extinction**

**Zhang ’12** (Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. “The Rise of China’s Political Softpower” 9/4/12 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content\_26421330.htm)

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

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**Text: We advocate an economic engagement with Venezuela through an engagement of the marginalized people**

**Using disability as a metaphor perpetuates social exclusion**

**Ben–Moshe 5** (Liat, Syracuse University, Doctorate in Disabilities studies 4–1–05,“Building Pedagogical Curb Cuts: Incorporating Disability in the University Classroom and Curriculum,” http://www.syr.edu/gradschool/pdf/resourcebooksvideos/Pedagogical%20Curb%20Cuts.pdf, accessed: 7–5–2012, p.107, CAS)

In the English language, using disability as a metaphor, an analogy and a derogatory term is common. Examples of such phrases and terms include: lame idea, blind justice, dumb luck, felt paralyzed, argument fell on deaf ears, crippling, crazy, insane, idiotic and retarded. One might argue that using these words without relating them to particular individuals is not offensive. However, using disability as an analogy not only offends certain individuals, but it also impedes clear communication, perpetuates false beliefs about disability and creates an environment of unease and exclusion.

**Their rhetoric impacts all of society recreating an ethic of exclusion that the aff cannot overcome**

Barnes, 92. Colin Barnes, Professor of Disability Studies in the [School of Social and Health Sciences Halmstad University](http://www.hh.se/english/research/professors/colinbarnes.8675.html), 1992, “*DISABLING IMAGERY AND THE MEDIA*” KL

This section has demonstrated how the vast majority of information about disability in the mass media is extremely negative. Disabling stereotypes which medicalise, patronise, criminalise and dehumanise disabled people abound in books, films, on television, and in the press. They form the bed–rock on which the attitudes towards, assumptions and about and expectations of disabled people are based. They are fundamental to the discrimination and exploitation which disabled people encounter daily, and contribute significantly to their systematic exclusion from mainstream community life. It is also clear that recent attempts by some elements in the media to remedy the situation and 'normalise' disabled people will only partly resolve the problem. The only solution with any hope of success is for all media organisations to provide the kind of information and imagery which; firstly, acknowledges and explores the complexity of the experience of disability and a disabled identity and; secondly, facilitates the meaningful integration of all disabled people into the mainstream economic and social life of the community. Failure to adopt such an approach has important implications for both disabled people and society as a whole. At present around twelve per cent of Britain's population are disabled people. It is highly likely that this figure will increase dramatically in the next few years due to several factors including medical advances and an ageing population – the likelihood of acquiring an impairment increases significantly with age. Disablism in the media is no longer simply morally and socially reprehensible it is economically inept.

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#### The resolution demands advocacy of a federal policy

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Economic engagement has to be government to government

**Daga, 13** - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic:

U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, <http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf>)

Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others

#### The affirmative’s failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s transformative and intellectual potential.

#### First is limits --- a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills --- even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable.

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis --- that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

David Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA, officer, American Forensic Association and National Communication Association. Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League, Masters in Communication, and Austin, JD, Suffolk University, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, Argumentation and Debate Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, Thirteen Edition

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean *Iliad* the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote weII-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Decisionmaking is the most portable and flexible skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

David Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA, officer, American Forensic Association and National Communication Association. Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League, Masters in Communication, and Austin, JD, Suffolk University, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, Argumentation and Debate

Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, Thirteen Edition

In the spring of 2011, facing a legacy of problematic U.S, military involvement in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and criticism for what some saw as slow sup­port of the United States for the people of Egypt and Tunisia as citizens of those nations ousted their formerly American-backed dictators, the administration of President Barack Obama considered its options in providing support for rebels seeking to overthrow the government of Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya. Public debate was robust as the administration sought to determine its most appropriate action. The president ultimately decided to engage in an international coalition, enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 through a number of measures including establishment of a no-fly zone through air and missile strikes to support rebels in Libya, but stopping short of direct U.S. intervention with ground forces or any occupation of Libya. While the action seemed to achieve its immediate objectives, most notably the defeat of Qaddafi and his regime, the American president received both criticism and praise for his mea­sured yet assertive decision. In fact, the past decade has challenged American leaders to make many difficult decisions in response to potentially catastrophic problems. Public debate has raged in chaotic environment of political division and apparent animosity, The process of public decision making may have never been so consequential or difficult. Beginning in the fall of 2008, Presidents Bush and Obama faced a growing eco­nomic crisis and responded in part with '’bailouts'' of certain Wall Street financial entities, additional bailouts of Detroit automakers, and a major economic stimu­lus package. All these actions generated substantial public discourse regarding the necessity, wisdom, and consequences of acting (or not acting). In the summer of 2011, the president and the Congress participated in heated debates (and attempted negotiations) to raise the nation's debt ceiling such that the U.S. Federal Govern­ment could pay its debts and continue government operations. This discussion was linked to a debate about the size of the exponentially growing national debt, gov­ernment spending, and taxation. Further, in the spring of 2012, U.S. leaders sought to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapon capability while gas prices in the United States rose, The United States considered its ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan in the face of nationwide protests and violence in that country1 sparked by the alleged burning of Korans by American soldiers, and Americans observed the actions of President Bashir Al-Assad and Syrian forces as they killed Syrian citizens in response to a rebel uprising in that nation and considered the role of the United States in that action. Meanwhile, public discourse, in part generated and intensified by the cam­paigns of the GOP candidates for president and consequent media coverage, addressed issues dividing Americans, including health care, women's rights to reproductive health services, the freedom of churches and church-run organiza­tions to remain true to their beliefs in providing (or electing not to provide) health care services which they oppose, the growing gap between the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans and the rest of the American population, and continued high levels of unemployment. More division among the American public would be hard to imagine. Yet through all the tension, conflict was almost entirely ver­bal in nature, aimed at discovering or advocating solutions to growing problems. Individuals also faced daunting decisions. A young couple, underwater with their mortgage and struggling to make their monthly payments, considered walking away from their loan; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job and a teenager decided between an iPhone and an iPad. Each of these situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consider­ation: others scorn to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and co­workers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make deci­sions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all engage in discourse surrounding our necessary decisions every day. To refinance or sell one’s home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an eco­nomical hybrid car, what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candi­date to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Should we watch The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue—all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, Time magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year.” Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of “great men” in the creation of his­tory, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs, online networking, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, and many other “wikis," and social networking sites, knowledge and truth are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. Through a quick keyword search, we have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? Much of what suffices as information is not reliable, or even ethically motivated. The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical deci­sions' relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength, And, critical thinking offers tools enabling the user to better understand the' nature and relative quality of the message under consider­ation. Critical thinkers are better users of information as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California's requirement states; Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambigu­ous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive arid deductive processes, including an under­standing of die formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. Competency in critical thinking is a prerequisite to participating effectively in human affairs, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly com­petitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing, and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical con­sequences; and communicates effectively with others in figuring our solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism,"1 Debate as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving uniquely promotes development of each of these skill sets. Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary research confirms the value of debate. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves die thinking of those involved,2 In particular, debate education improves the ability to think critically. In a com­prehensive review of the relevant research, Kent Colbert concluded, "'The debate-critical thinking literature provides presumptive proof ■favoring a positive debate-critical thinking relationship.11'1 Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates, formal or informal, These take place in intrapersonal commu­nications, with which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, and in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to argu­ments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of’ others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job offer, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few Of the thousands of deci­sions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of respon­sibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for our product, or a vote for our favored political candidate. Some people make decision by flipping a coin. Others act on a whim or respond unconsciously to “hidden persuaders.” If the problem is trivial—such as whether to go to a concert or a film—the particular method used is unimportant. For more crucial matters, however, mature adults require a reasoned methods of decision making. Decisions should be justified by good reasons based on accurate evidence and valid reasoning.

#### Limited deliberative forums like debate which discuss Latin American specific policies prevent elite domination, develops agency, and promotes epistemological equality

**Baxter 10** (Jorge, Education Specialist, Department of Education and Culture in the Organization of American States, Former Coordinator of the Inter-American Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices at the OAS, PHD in International Comparative Education and Policy from University of Maryland College Park, “Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy, 3(2), 224-254, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ried/article/viewFile/1016/1307>, Accessed: 7/30/13)

In the context of international¶ education cooperation and international¶ development in Latin America, where¶ there are great asymmetries in power and¶ resources, it seems that this critique could¶ have some validity. However, rather than¶ concluding that deliberation and participation¶ should be reduced, one could conclude (as¶ is argued in this paper) that they should¶ be enhanced and expanded. Those that¶ advocate for a “thicker” democratization in¶ the region would likely advocate for a more¶ substantive approach to deliberation in policy¶ which establishes certain parameters such¶ as “education is an intrinsic human right,”¶ and which would place an emphasis on¶ achieving quality education outcomes¶ for all as the goal. This does not mean that¶ they would not advocate for deliberation but¶ rather would set parameters for deliberation¶ in order to ensure that the outcomes do not¶ lead to “unjust” policy (e.g., a policy that¶ might promote more inequity in education).¶ Those that advocate for a “thinner” approach¶ to democratization would tend to advocate¶ for a procedural approach to deliberation in¶ education policy and would most likely place¶ emphasis on equal opportunity of access¶ to quality education.¶ Instability critique: Education in Latin¶ America suffers from too much instability and¶ is too politicized. Increasing participation and¶ deliberation would only further politicize the¶ situation and polarize those who advocate for¶ educational reform and those who block it.¶ The average term of a minister of education¶ is one-and-a-half years; each time a new¶ minister comes to office, new policies are¶ passed which, according to deliberative¶ democratic theory, would need to be reasoned¶ and debated with citizens. Deliberation in this¶ context would promote even more instability¶ and would lead to further politicization of¶ education reform.¶ Response: Political instability and¶ lack of continuity in policy reform are serious¶ limitations that to some degree are inherent¶ in democratic institutions and processes. The¶ reality is that if any education reform is to¶ succeed in the long term, it needs more than¶ the efforts of governments or international¶ organizations. It needs the sustained support¶ of stakeholders across sectors (public,¶ private, and civil society) and over time. It¶ has been argued that the main problem in¶ basic education in Latin America is the lack¶ of a broad social consensus, recognizing¶ that there is a problem of equity and quality¶ in the provision of education (Schiefelbein,¶ 1997). This lack of broad social consensus¶ is especially challenging where there is, as¶ noted in the critique, a lack of continuity¶ in education reform. Reform in education¶ takes time, sometimes decades. Ensuring¶ continuity in education reform policies is¶ therefore crucial, and this requires public¶ consensus. Deliberative forums convening¶ government, private sector, and civil society¶ groups can contribute to developing this public¶ consensus and to providing more continuity¶ in policy. Deliberative forums combined¶ with collaborative projects can help promote¶ learning, distribute institutional memory,¶ support capacity-building efforts, and bring¶ more resources to bear on the education¶ reform process. Creating a space for citizens¶ to deliberate on the role of education is¶ fundamental for promoting broad social¶ consensus around education reforms. In Latin¶ America, the most innovative and successful¶ reforms have all created multiple and¶ continuous opportunities for diverse groups¶ across the education sector and society to¶ provide input and to have opportunities for¶ meaningful collaborative action. International¶ organizations, leveraging their regional and¶ international position, can contribute by¶ promoting policy dialogue and collaborative¶ actions among ministries and also with key¶ stakeholders across sectors. The challenge¶ is to develop a better understanding of how¶ deliberation can be used to promote more¶ collaborative as opposed to more adversarial¶ and partisan forms of politics. This is perhaps¶ one area which deliberative theorists need to¶ explore more.¶ 5. Power critique: The final critique relates¶ the possibility that increasing deliberation¶ and participation can lead to increased¶ inequality. Fung and Wright (2003) note¶ that deliberation can turn into domination¶ in a context where “participants in these¶ processes usually face each other from¶ unequal positions of power.” Every reform¶ in education creates winners and losers, and¶ very few create “win-win” situations. Those¶ in power would have to submit to the rules of¶ deliberation and relinquish “control” over the¶ various dimensions of democratic decisionmaking.¶ This is naïve and not politically¶ feasible.¶ Response: This is a valid critique¶ worth considering. Structural inequalities¶ and asymmetries of power in governments¶ and international institutions in Latin America¶ have facilitated domination by elites in terms¶ of authority, power, and control in politics.¶ Asymmetries of power in international¶ cooperation in education are also clear,¶ especially when powerful financial (World¶ Bank, IDB, IMF) or political (OAS, UNESCO)¶ organizations engage with local stakeholders¶ and condition policy options with funding¶ or political support. What this paper has¶ argued is relevant again here: that instead of¶ rejecting further democratization in the face¶ of these challenges, including the challenge¶ of elite “domination,” what is needed is more¶ and better democracy, defined in terms of its¶ breadth, depth, range, and control. Finally,¶ dealing with elite domination in international¶ deliberative forums will require conscious and¶ skilled facilitation on the part of international¶ organizations, which themselves are often¶ elitist and hegemonic.¶ Final Thoughts: So What?¶ Perhaps the most critical question¶ that emerges in the argument for increased¶ democratization and deliberation is simply:¶ So what? Does increased democratization and¶ deliberation actually lead to better outcomes¶ in education? More empirical research on this¶ critical question is needed. However, experiments¶ in deliberative democracy in education reform¶ in Brazil through the UNESCO and Ministry of¶ Education Coordinated Action Plan and Porto¶ Alegre‘s Citizen School, and also to some degree¶ at the international level with the OAS pilot¶ experiment in developing a more democratic¶ model of international cooperation from 2001-¶ 2005, have shown that deliberative processes¶ can enhance learning on the part of those¶ participating. Fung and Wright (2003) refer to¶ these experiments in deliberation as “schools¶ of democracy” because participants exercise¶ their capacities of argument, planning, and¶ evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens¶ who participate in deliberative forums develop¶ competencies that are important not only for¶ active citizenship (listening, communication,¶ problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing¶ change and school reform. Many of the same¶ skills that are developed through citizen¶ deliberation and participation are also essential¶ for transforming school cultures, promoting¶ “learning organizations” (Senge, 2000), fostering¶ communities of reflective practitioners (Schon,¶ 1991) and developing communities of practice¶ (Wenger, 2001). There is evidence from some¶ research that democratic interactions can create¶ knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and¶ relevant than that produced in authoritarian¶ environments (Jaramillo, 2005). Another¶ important aspect of enhancing deliberative¶ democracy and democratization is that it moves¶ from a focus on individuals and their own¶ preferences towards more collective forms of¶ learning and collaboration.¶ Up to now, international organizations¶ have endorsed a “thin” version of democratization¶ that is content with formal and centralized¶ mechanisms of “representation” and “policy¶ dialogue.” If a new, more deliberative and¶ democratic model of cooperation in education in¶ the region were to emerge, what would it look¶ like?¶ First of all, a more deliberative and¶ democratic model of international cooperation in¶ education would involve more direct and deeper¶ forms of participation from everyday citizens,¶ including teachers, school directors, families,¶ school communities, students, and mesolevel¶ actors such as civil society organizations.¶ This participation would move beyond simple¶ consultation to more authentic forms of joint¶ decision-making and deliberation. The model¶ would involve more accountability on the¶ part of international organizations in terms¶ of transparency, and would require injecting¶ ethical reasoning into policies and programming.¶ In addition, a new more democratic model of¶ international cooperation would expand the¶ range of policy options available to countries¶ through devolution of authority, power, and¶ control, combined with oversight and horizontal¶ accountability mechanisms. A more democratic¶ model of international cooperation would stress¶ valuing, systematizing, and disseminating¶ local knowledge and innovation. Finally,¶ democratization and deliberation in international¶ cooperation in education would lead to enhanced¶ learning and agency on the part of participating¶ countries, groups, and individuals, and thus¶ contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality¶ and equity in education at national and local¶ levels.

#### Second is fairness --- our argument is not a rule --- it’s an expression that what the aff said was not fair to the negative --- we have been excluded from active participation in this debate --- you’re voting against the aff for being a type of politics that doesn’t care about able opponents, which is crucial to the success of ideas. We should understand fairness as a form of agnostic politics.

**Hatab 2**, Prof of Philosophy @ Old Dominion University, (Lawrence J., The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147)

Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent. As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants**.** [25](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html#FOOT25) In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. [26](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html#FOOT26) An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights**,** not as something "natural" possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal, procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice.

#### Third is switch side debate—a forum of discussion that facilitates political agonism where the negative can respond to the aff is the most intellectually effective way to overcome moral hazards and make decisions--the process here is more important than the substance of their arguments.

**Gutmann 96** Amy Gutmann , is the president of Penn and former prof @ Princeton, AND Dennis Thompson is Alfred North Whitehead Professor of Political Philosophy at Harvard University, Democracy and Disagreement, 1996 , pp 1

Of the challenges that American democracy faces today, none is more formidable than the problem of moral disagreement. Neither the theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found an adequate way to cope with conflicts about fundamental values. We address the challenge of moral disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life . Along with a growing number of other political theorists, we call this conception deliberative democracy . The core idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions. But the meaning and implications of the idea are complex . Although the idea has a long history, it is still in search of a theory. We do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative democracy, but we do hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of deliberation that is possible and desirable in the face of moral disagreement in democracies. Some scholars have criticized liberal political theory for neglecting moral deliberation. Others have analyzed the philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy, and still others have begun to explore institutional reforms that would promote deliberation. Yet nearly all of them stop at the point where deliberation itself begins. None has systematically examined the substance of deliberation-the theoretical principles that should guide moral argument and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public policy. That is our subject, and it takes us into the everyday forums of democratic politics, where moral argument regularly appears but where theoretical analysis too rarely goes. Deliberative democracy involves reasoning about politics, and nothing has been more controversial in political philosophy than the nature of reason in politics . We do not believe that these controversies have to be settled before deliberative principles can guide the practice of democracy . Since on occasion citizens and their representatives already engage in the kind of reasoning that those principles recommend, deliberative democracy simply asks that they do so more consistently and comprehensively. The best way to prove the value of this kind of reasoning is to show its role in arguments about specific principles and policies, and its contribution to actual political debates. That is also ultimately the best justification for our conception of deliberative democracy itself. But to forestall possible misunderstandings of our conception of deliberative democracy, we offer some preliminary remarks about the scope and method of this book. The aim of the moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy prescribes falls between impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is reciprocity, the subject of Chapter 2, but no less essential are the other principles developed in later chapters. When citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements. The precise content of reciprocity is difficult to determine in theory, but its general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It can be seen in the difference between acting in one's self-interest (say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or a lucky break) and acting fairly (following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt). In many of the controversies discussed later in the book, the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them. Even though the quality of deliberation and the conditions under which it is conducted are far from ideal in the controversies we consider, the fact that in each case some citizens and some officials make arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a deliberative perspective is not utopian. To clarify what reciprocity might demand under non-ideal conditions, we develop a distinction between deliberative and non deliberative disagreement. Citizens who reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong. They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken . (The abortion example-to which we often return in the book-is meant to be illustrative. For readers who deny that there is any room for deliberative disagreement on abortion, other political controversies can make the same point.) The presence of deliberative disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they should adopt. When a disagreement is not deliberative (for example, aboutapolicy to legalize discrimination against blacks and women), citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their opponents. In deliberative disagreement (for example, about legalizing abortion), citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement , and believe that, though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a morally robust democratic life. Although both of us have devoted some of our professional life to urging these ideas on public officials and our fellow citizens in forums of practicalpolitics, this book is primarily the product of scholarly rather than political deliberation. Insofar as it reaches beyond the academic community, it is addressed to citizens and officials in their more reflective frame of mind. Given its academic origins, some readers may be inclined to complain that only professors could be so unrealistic as to believe that moral reasoning can help solve political problems. But such a complaint would misrepresent our aims. To begin with, we do not think that academic discussion (whether in scholarly journals or college classrooms) is a model for moral deliberation in politics. Academic discussion need not aim at justifying a practical decision, as deliberation must. Partly for this reason, academic discussion is likely to be insensitive to the contexts of ordinary politics: the pressures of power, the problems of inequality, the demands of diversity, the exigencies of persuasion. Some critics of deliberative democracy show a similar insensitivity when they judge actual political deliberations by the standards of ideal philosophical reflection. Actual deliberation is inevitably defective, but so is philosophical reflection practiced in politics. The appropriate comparison is between the ideals of democratic deliberation and philosophical reflection , or between the application of eachin the nonideal circumstances of politics. We do not assume that politics should be a realm where thelogical syllogism rules. Nor do we expect even the more appropriate standard of mutual respect alwaysto prevail in politics. A deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and even violence. It is partly because moral argument has so much unrealized potential in democratic politics that we believe it deserves more attention. Because its place in politics is so precarious, the need to find it a more secure home and to nourish its development is all the more pressing. Yet because it is also already' pert of our common experience, we have reason to hope that it can survive and even prosper if philosophers along with citizens and public officials better appreciate its value in politics. Some readers may still wonder why deliberation should have such a prominent place in democracy. Surely, they may say, citizens should care more about the justice of public policies than the process by which they are adopted, at least so long as the process is basically fair and at least minimally democratic. One of our main aims in this book is to cast doubt on the dichotomy between policies andprocess that this concern assumes. Having good reason as individuals to believe that a policy is just does not mean that collectively as citizens we have sufficient justification to legislate on the basis of those reasons. The moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends in part on the moral quality of the process by whichcitizens collectively reach those judgments. Deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted. Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends.

#### Fourth is truth-testing. Dialogic partners need to acknowledge the fact that we share a shared world --- this doesn’t imply consensus or shared values. But it means we need to be able to understand how what they have said affects us and vice versa.

**Hauser 06**

Gerad Hauser, 2006 (Professor of Communication and the University of Colorado Boulder. His research is in the relation between formal and vernacular rhetoric as they shape and are shaped by public spheres, "Vernacular dialogue and the rhetoricality of public opinion."

The complementarity of I and we does not mean that there is a convergence of opinion among dialogic partners, only that they inhabit a common world of concerns that requires them to take account of one another while arriving at judgments. Extrapolating from Taylor's analysis of the atomic I and molecular we of face-to-face dialogue to the more complex multilogue from which a public emerges, the same requirement of complementarity holds. The countless acts of publicly expressed opinions on contingent affairs requires the type of social cooperation- even in opposition—that occurs only when participants read the expressions of others with a degree of accuracy that permits them to ascertain their relevance to and consequences for themselves and, more importantly, the social world they share. Common understanding of this sort would be impossible without a language of common meanings. An ensemble of individuals referred to as a "public" is, when unconstrained, liable to the contentious behaviors of factions who differ in opinions and interests, as Madison's Publius warned in Federalist no. 10. A public is not necessarily a group in consensus. The supporters of New Democracy who had demonstrated in Sindagma square the week before the Greek election doubtless had internal differences over their political and economic concerns; surely their interests diverged from their partisan countrymen and women in the rural regions, the mountains to the north, and the islands dotting the Aegean. They were manifesting every sign of deep division from their counter parts supporting PASOK, but they were not unintelligible to one another as they sometimes were to American eyes and ears illiterate in Greek politics and political conventions. The thesis that human reality is socially constructed is by now almost an academic commonplace. Its widespread acceptance, however, does not alter its importance for understanding the extent to which the language available to a people determines the social world they share. For an ensemble of strangers to have a common understanding of reality requires more than a common language permitting intersubjective understanding. Common understanding entails a language that applies to a common reference world, even when our customs, preferences, and methods pertaining to that world are at odds. The bond of common meaning is not shared values and meanings but the sharing of the shared world, commonly understood even if differently lived (Taylor, 1971).

# 2NC

## Framework

#### Politics – debate as a competitive political game is the best framework to solve dogmatism and human brutality

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Vico asked his audience at the University of Naples in 1708 to debate two competing ways of knowing: Cartesian rationality versus the poetic world of the ancients. Vico, the “pre-law advisor” of his day, saw law as a rhetorical game. That is, he understood the civic (ethical) value of competi-tion itself.12 He understood that Cartesian rationality, like religious and ideological fundamentalism, generates a kind of certainty that shuts down robust debate. Vico’s comprehensive vision suggests, in effect, that people should practice law and politics not as the search for the most rational or logically correct outcomes but rather as passionate and embodied yet peaceful competitive play. Vico inspires this vision of law and politics as play because he sees that all things in the human mind, including law and politics, are at one with the human body. As Vico put it as he concluded his 1708 address, “[T]he soul should be drawn to love by means of bodily images; for once it loves it is easily taught to believe; and when it believes and loves it should be inflamed so that it wills things by means of its normal intemperance.”13 Vico had no hope that such abstract moral principles as liberty, equality, justice, and tolerance could effectively offset the “crude and rough” nature of men.14 The Holy Bible and the Qur’an contain normative principles of love, tolerance, equal respect, and peace, but these commands have not forestalled ancient and modern religious warfare. This essay proposes that humans learn how to keep the peace not by obeying the norms, rules, and principles of civil conduct but by learning how to play, and thereby reintegrating the mind and the body. People do law, politics, and economic life well when they do them in the same ways and by the same standards that structure and govern good competitive sports and games. The word “sport” derives from “port” and “portal” and relates to the words “disport” and “transport.” The word at least hints that the primitive and universal joy of play carries those who join the game across space to a better, and ideally safer, place—a harbor that Vico him-self imagined. This essay’s bold proposition honors Vico in many ways. Its “grand theory” matches the scope of Vico’s comprehensive and integrated vision of the human condition. It plausibly confirms Vico’s hope for a “concep-tion of a natural law for all of humanity” that is rooted in human historical practice.15 Seeing these core social processes as play helps us to escape from arid academic habits and to “learn to think like children,” just as Vico urged.16 Imagining law and politics as play honors Vico above all because, if we attain Ruskin’s epigraphic ideal,17 we will see that the peace-tending qualities of sports and games already operate under our noses. Seeing law and politics as play enables us “to reach out past our inclination to make experience familiar through the power of the concept and to engage the power of the image. We must reconstruct the human world not through concepts and criteria but as something we can practically see.”18 If at its end readers realize that they could have seen, under their noses, the world as this essay sees it without ever having read it, this essay will successfully honor Vico. As Vico would have predicted, formal academic theory has played at best a marginal role in the construction of competitive games. Ordinary people have created cricket and football, and common law and electoral politics and fair market games, more from the experience of doing them than from formal theories of competitive games. When they play interna-tional football today, ordinary people in virtually every culture in the world recreate the experience of competitive games. Playing competitive games unites people across cultures in a common normative world.19 Within Vico’s social anthropological and proto-scientific framework, the claim that competitive play can generate peaceful civic life is purely empirical: law and politics in progressively peaceful political systems already are nothing more or less than competitive games. All empirical description operates within some, though too often ob-scured, normative frame. This essay’s normative frame is clear. It holds, with Shaw’s epigraph, above: Human brutalities waged against other hu-mans—suicide bombings, genocides, tribal and religious wars that provoke the indiscriminate rape, murder, torture, and enslavement of men, women, and children, often because they are labeled “evil”—are the worst things that we humans do. We should learn not to do them. In Vico’s anti-Cartesian, non-foundational world, no method exists to demonstrate that this essay’s normative core is “correct,” or even “better than,” say, the core norm holding that the worst thing humans do is dishonor God. Readers who reject Shaw’s and this essay’s normative frame may have every reason to reject the essay’s entire argument. However, this essay does describe empirically how those whose core norm requires honoring any absolute, including God, above all else regu-larly brutalize other human beings, and why those who live by the norms of good competitive play do not. People brutalize people, as Shaw’s Caesar observed, in the name of right and honor and peace. Evaluated by the norm that human brutality is the worst thing humans do, the essay shows why and how the human invention of competitive play short circuits the psy-chology of a righteousness-humiliation-brutality cycle. We cannot help but see and experience on fields of contested play testosterone-charged males striving mightily to defeat one another. Yet at the end of play, losers and winners routinely shake hands and often hug; adult competitors may dine and raise a glass together.20 Whether collectively invented as a species-wide survival adaptation or not, institutionalized competitive play under-cuts the brutality cycle by displacing religious and other forms of funda-mentalist righteousness with something contingent, amoral, and thus less lethal. Play thereby helps humans become Shaw’s “race that can under-stand.”

Privileging personal narratives squelches debate and ruins the ‘switch-side’ model – turns the aff because narratives shut down voices

Stannard 6 (Matt, Director of Forensics and Associate Editor – U. Wyoming, “Deliberation, Democracy, and Debate”, Spring, 4-28, <http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html>)//VP

But the Academy is not only under attack from "outsiders," and not merely because the post-September 11 world has given the nod to sterile and commodified forms of patriotic communication and safe, symbolic dissent. Both inside and outside college life, the value of discussion is increasingly under attack, under sabotage, sometimes unintentionally, sometimes violently, and the attackers are often not recognizable as such. We cower away from religious fanatics because we know they refuse to entertain the possibility of their incorrectness, but we fail to see our own failure to embrace the possibilities of our own incorrectness. We label other points of view "ideological" from vantage points we assume to be free of ideology, or we excuse our narrow-mindedness by telling ourselves that "ideology is inevitable." Part of this weakening of our commitment to open debate is our recent, seemingly liberating embrace of personal conviction over public deliberation, the self-comfort of personal narrative over the clumsy, awkward, and fallible attempt to forge consensus across the lines of identity and politics. The fetishization of personal conviction is no less threatening to the public forum than violent authoritarianism—both seek to render disagreement impossible, close off deliberation, and take us closer towards eventual, unnatural silence. The alternative I would offer today is rooted in the communicative ethics of deliberation, and its academic embodiment is the practice of debate—both in competitive and non-competitive formats: debate as rule-based cooperative truth-generation. Deliberative ethics, following the communication theories of Jurgen Habermas, and the ethical theories of Emmanuel Levinas, among others, are ethics concerning how we collectively construct "truth" itself. What I am speaking of might be called the democratization of truth. Such talk is immensely unpopular on both sides of the ideological spectrum.

Debating about the state does not mean capitulating to it --- discussing government policy creates critical understanding that facilitates resistance against its worst abuses

**Donovan and Larkin 6** (Clair and Phil, Australian National University, Politics, Vol. 26, No. 1)

We do not suggest that political science should merely fall into line with the government instrumentalism that we have identified, becoming a 'slave social science' (see Donovan, 2005). But, we maintain that political scientists should be able to engage with practical politics on their own terms and should be able to provide research output that is of value to practitioners. It is because of its focus on understanding, explanation, conceptualisation and classification that political science has the potential to contribute more to practical politics, and more successfully. As Brian Barry notes, 'Granting (for the sake of argument) that [students of politics] have some methods that enable us to improve on the deliverances of untutored common sense or political journalism, what good do they do? The answer to that question is: not much. But if we change the question and ask what good they could do, I believe that it is possible to justify a more positive answer' (Bany, 2004, p. 22). A clear understanding of how institutions and individuals interact or how different institutions interact with each other can provide clear and useful insights that practitioners can successfully use, making - or perhaps remaking - a political science that 'directs research efforts to good questions and enables incremental improvements to be made' (ibid., 19). In this sense, political science already has the raw material to maake this contribution, but it chooses not to utilise it in this way: no doubt, in part, because academics are motivated to present their findings to other academics and not the practitioners within the institutions they study.

#### Its better than ignoring the state --- their framework is the political equivalent of burying your head in the sand --- they cede the political.

**Hoppe 99** Robert Hoppe is Professor of Policy and knowledge in the Faculty of Management and Governance at Twente University, the Netherlands. "Argumentative Turn" Science and Public Policy, volume 26, number 3, June 1999, pages 201–210 works.bepress.com

ACCORDING TO LASSWELL (1971), policy science is about the production and application of knowledge of and in policy. Policy-makers who desire to tackle problems on the political agenda successfully, should be able to mobilise the best available knowledge. This requires high-quality knowledge in policy. Policy-makers and, in a democracy, citizens, also need to know how policy processes really evolve. This demands precise knowledge of policy.

There is an obvious link between the two: the more and better the knowledge of policy, the easier it is to mobilise knowledge in policy. Lasswell expresses this interdependence by defining the policy scientist's operational task as eliciting the maximum rational judgement of all those involved in policy-making.

For the applied policy scientist or policy analyst this implies the development of two skills. First, for the sake of mobilising the best available knowledge in policy, he/she should be able to mediate between different scientific disciplines. Second, to optimise the interdependence between science in and of policy, she/he should be able to mediate between science and politics. Hence Dunn's (1994, page 84) formal definition of policy analysis as an applied social science discipline that uses multiple research methods in a context of argumentation, public debate [and political struggle] to create, evaluate critically, and communicate policy-relevant knowledge.

Historically, the differentiation and successful institutionalisation of policy science can be interpreted as the spread of the functions of knowledge organisation, storage, dissemination and application in the knowledge system (Dunn and Holzner, 1988; van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1989, page 29). Moreover, this scientification of hitherto 'unscientised' functions, by including science of policy explicitly, aimed to gear them to the political system. In that sense, Lerner and Lasswell's (1951) call for policy sciences anticipated, and probably helped bring about, the scientification of politics.

Peter Weingart (1999) sees the development of the science-policy nexus as a dialectical process of the scientification of politics/policy and the politicisation of science. Numerous studies of political controversies indeed show that science advisors behave like any other self-interested actor (Nelkin, 1995). Yet science somehow managed to maintain its functional cognitive authority in politics. This may be because of its changing shape, which has been characterised as the emergence of a post-parliamentary and post-national network democracy (Andersen and Burns, 1996, pages 227-251).

National political developments are put in the background by ideas about uncontrollable, but apparently inevitable, international developments; in Europe, national state authority and power in public policy-making is leaking away to a new political and administrative elite, situated in the institutional ensemble of the European Union. National representation is in the hands of political parties which no longer control ideological debate. The authority and policy-making power of national governments is also leaking away towards increasingly powerful policy-issue networks, dominated by functional representation by interest groups and practical experts.

In this situation, public debate has become even more fragile than it was. It has become diluted by the predominance of purely pragmatic, managerial and administrative argument, and under-articulated as a result of an explosion of new political schemata that crowd out the more conventional ideologies. The new schemata do feed on the ideologies; but in larger part they consist of a random and unarticulated 'mish-mash' of attitudes and images derived from ethnic, local-cultural, professional, religious, social movement and personal political experiences.

The market-place of political ideas and arguments is thriving; but on the other hand, politicians and citizens are at a loss to judge its nature and quality.

Neither political parties, nor public officials, interest groups, nor social movements and citizen groups, nor even the public media show any inclination, let alone competency, in ordering this inchoate field. In such conditions, scientific debate provides a much needed minimal amount of order and articulation of concepts, arguments and ideas. Although frequently more in rhetoric than substance, reference to scientific 'validation' does provide politicians, public officials and citizens alike with some sort of compass in an ideological universe in disarray.

For policy analysis to have any political impact under such conditions, it should be able somehow to continue 'speaking truth' to political elites who are ideologically uprooted, but cling to power; to the elites of administrators, managers, professionals and experts who vie for power in the jungle of organisations populating the functional policy domains of post-parliamentary democracy; and to a broader audience of an ideologically disoriented and politically disenchanted citizenry.

2nc – ssd overview

# SSD

#### **refusing to defend resolutional government action when affirmative is a failure to consider arguments from a different point of view and constitutes an immature assertion that one side is always right coupled with the refusal to actually test their claims —just because they chose to run their argument on the aff doesn’t mean that they had too, which shortcircuits their offense.**

#### **Two warrants for switch side being key to decision making in Steinberg and Freeley**

#### **1. Settling disagreements--considering contrary opinions by rational adversaries is the most effective way to settle moral disagreements that make up the biggest decisions in America today—our evidence is comparative between different decision types**

#### **2. Rigorous filter--running every idea through a rigorous and equitable forum means the better decision always comes out on top—switch side also neutralizes the potential for rash bad decisions because it requires careful consideration before action**

#### **Switch side debate is also key real world advocacy training because advocates have to persuasively defend positions against opponents with disparate ideologies**

#### Their FW instills dogmatism – the belief that only one position is ever true and that the other side is not worth discussing allows debaters to avoid questioning their convictions – dogmatism is the reason racism exists because it allows people to assert their beliefs without examining both sides

Switch-side debate empirically encourages progressive

#### Switch-side debate empirically encourages progressive reforms that check neo-conservatism

Mitchell, et al. 7 – Associate Professor of Communication and Director of the William Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh, Gordon R., Eric English, Stephen Llano, Gordon R. Mitchell, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief & Carly Woods, “Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction” June 2007, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 221 – 225, http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf

It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff ’s counsel in Hamdan , which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent \*the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’

#### It’s key to activism

Brad Hall, 8 – Masters in Communication Studies from Wake Forest and Special Projects Manager with the Offices of Al and Tipper Gore

(“[eDebate] Mmm Lentils, Chikpeas, and Mohair,” 7-11-2008, http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2008-July/075330.html)

As someone who has (at least temporarily) left debate to do public policy-related research, I think Andy overlooks the benefits of the \*process\* of policy debate and its connection to his call for "political agency in the real world." Ross and others have made this point many times, but it is worth briefly reiterating: switch sides public policy debate enables activism by teaching a research and decision making process that is applicable outside of the insulated debate community. While debates do not directly change public policy (after all, Mohammed Ali Hammadi still roams the streets of Beirut), the skills of debate teach debaters how to help with "activist" causes once they leave debate. For example, policy debaters are taught the skills of researching a topic both quickly (finding one or two politics cards in 3 minutes) and in depth (consider that hundreds of high school debaters around the country are currently attempting to exhaust the debate over global warming and alternative energy). Debaters learn a number of other useful skills, from word economy to prioritization of the best arguments. But most importantly, the process of reflecting on this research and considering both sides of a public policy issue teaches the participants of debate a decision making process that is applicable to the rest of their life.

Many, many traditional policy debaters have taken these skills and translated them into work at think tanks, law firms, universities, corporations, journalism, and other sectors. NDT Champion Larry Tribe has produced groundbreaking societal change through the law just to cite one example. Glenn Greenwald is one of the most popular progressive bloggers whose research acumen is obvious. Real change has been produced by these individuals (and many others), and it continues to be.

The real question should be: how do alternative models of debate promote any of these skills/process, or if they don't (since they often base their existence on a criticism of these aspects of policy debate), what do they offer to activism outside of debate? It is somewhat noble to claim that the structures of debate are changed by alternative models (though this is often not the case), but unless you expect the actual channels of power like Congress to be similarly changed, what impact does non-traditional non-policy debate have on the "real world"?

To return to the thrust of Andy's original post, there are few activities I would rather see public money be spent on than training high school and college students in traditional, switch sides policy debate

# 1NR

## CP

**Questioning rhetoric is key to expose and stop the hegemonic unawareness and bias that hides in the language we use.**

**Lunsford 2005** (Scott, Scott Lunsford has his M.A. in writing and began his PhD in Rhetoric and Writing studies in 2005, January 1st 2005, “ Seeking a Rhetoric of the Rhetoric of Dis/abilities”, Rhetoric and Composition PhD Papers, Department of English, [http://digitalcommons.utep.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=rhet\_comp&sei–redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Ddisability%2520and%2520rehtoric%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D10%26ved%3D0CHsQFjAJ%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.utep.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1000%2526context%253Drhet\_comp%26ei%3DOaTsT\_2lJIuY8gSI–6y–BQ%26usg%3DAFQjCNGi67PqtbUndsIS7f6HPkueRkRJ8A%26sig2%3DsO\_68H9jX3Eo8B09DxEAPg#search=%22disability%20rehtoric%22](http://digitalcommons.utep.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=rhet_comp&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Ddisability%2520and%2520rehtoric%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D10%26ved%3D0CHsQFjAJ%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.utep.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1000%2526context%253Drhet_comp%26ei%3DOaTsT_2lJIuY8gSI-6y-BQ%26usg%3DAFQjCNGi67PqtbUndsIS7f6HPkueRkRJ8A%26sig2%3DsO_68H9jX3Eo8B09DxEAPg#search=%22disability%20rehtoric%22), accessed 6/28/12, JK)

So, yes, discussing words, and ultimately asking why we valorize some words over others, is important. How else do we perform metadiscussions without these words, words appropriate or not? When we stop interrogating the rhetoricity of rhetoric we stop theorizing about our own discipline. I think it’s safe to say that we might never find the answers to Why?, but it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t ask the questions about our own rhetorics. When we stop complicating any rhetoric, its discourse may become fixed, second–nature, and taken for granted. We stop thinking about that discourse, and, eventually, it becomes trite and slips into silence and then invisibility. We cannot stop questioning what becomes commonplace: “It must be that way because it’s always been that way.” And, thus, we cannot stop questioning authority. Science, for example, in its authoritative “absolutism” and “objectivity,” should not escape criticism of labels used about people with disabilities. Should we not question scientific terms which are set firm because of their very “scientificity”? James Wilson takes on this question in his symposium article, “Evolving Metaphors of Disease in Postgenomic Science: Stigmatizing Disability.” He examines terms used in eugenics, terms which can be figuratively attached to attributes shared by people with disabilities. The eugenics movement, Wilson says, attempts in part to “eliminate so–called ‘defectives’” such as “deadbeat,” “oft–shifty,” “renegade,” and “immigrant” DNA sequences (199). Genes termed as mutants, lesions, and errant “are cast as misfits that subvert the social collective” (198). Thus, these metaphors “are profoundly disturbing to many members of the disability community” (199). If these terms are set by science, what is the likelihood for change? Does science prevail while rhetoric continues only to ask questions? Probably. But the fact that we are even asking questions about terms and tropes leads to awareness. When we become aware that science is not always linguistically appropriate, that there might just be a Hearing culture, that terms not yet created will someday be so and people will have their disagreements with these new terms as well—when we become conscious of all of these and more, we will not return to hegemonic unawareness where dis/abilities are invisible. Deconstructing questions must always be asked, for if we become satisfied with our answers, we run the risk of slipping back into our own comfortable silence.

**Discourse analysis is necessary to understand the basis of violence of ableism and its relationship to society**

**Oliver no date** [ Politics and Language: Understanding the Disability Discourse Mike Oliver Professor of Disability Studies University of Greenwich, London, <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/Oliver/politics%20and%20lang%20oliver.pdf>

In order to fully understand this in respect of policy and practice, it is necessary to further develop the concept of 'discourse'. The French philosopher Foucault (1973) suggests that the way we talk about the world and the way we experience it are inextricably linked -the names we give to things shapes our experience of them and our experience of things in the world influences the names we give to them. This concept and its relationship to language has been described as follows; "Discourse is about more than language. Discourse is about the interplay between language and social relationships, in which some groups are able to achieve dominance for their interests in the way in which the world is defined and acted upon. Such groups include not only dominant economic classes, but also men within patriarchy, and white people within the racism of colonial and post-colonial societies, as well as professionals in relation to service users. Language is a central aspect of discourse through which power is reproduced and communicated". (Hugman 1991.37) A good example of this in respect of policy is the way the discourse of caring has been central to recent attempts to close down long-stay institutions of all kinds. In linking language to politics through the notion of discourse, Ignatieff argues that the discourse of welfare provision which emphasises compassion, caring and altruism, is inappropriate when applied to a second discourse, that of citizenship "The language of citizenship is not properly about compassion at all, since compassion is a private virtue which cannot be legislated or enforced. The practice of citizenship is about ensuring everyone the entitlements necessary to the exercise of their liberty. As a political question, welfare is about rights, not caring, and the history of citizenship has been the struggle to make freedom real, not to tie us all in the leading strings of therapeutic good intentions". (Ignatieff 1989.72) Hence the linking of caring to welfare has unfortunate consequences because it has served to deny people their entitlements as citizens. "The pell-mell retreat from the language of justice to the language of caring is perhaps the most worrying sign of the contemporary decadence of the language of citizenship...Put another way, the history of citizenship of entitlement is a history of freedom, not primarily a history of compassion". (Ignatieff 1989.72) Thus the very language of welfare provision serves to deny disabled people the right to be treated as fully competent, autonomous individuals, as active citizens. Care in the community, caring for people, providing services through care managers and care workers all structure the welfare discourse in particular ways and imply a particular view of disabled people. As early as 1986, disabled people in response to the Audit Commission’s critical review of community care, were arguing for an abandonment of such patronizing and dependency creating language (BCODP 1986). Organisations controlled and run by disabled people including the BCODP, the Spinal Injuries Association and the newly formed European Network on Independent Living have already begun to move to a language of entitlement emphasizing independent living, social support and the use of personal assistants. One could provide a similar analysis of the emergence of the term ‘special’ in education. Arising from the concern of the Warnock Committee (DES 1978) to de-medicalise the education of ‘handicapped children’, as they were then called, special was the label chosen to refer to the kinds of provision these children (who were themselves re-defined as having learning difficulties) would need. There were three reasons for this change in language; firstly to try to replace negative labels (‘delicate’, ‘sub-normal’ etc) with more positive ones; secondly to switch the focus from the child’s medical to their educational needs; and thirdly, to provide a linguistic basis to enable both the provision and practice of special education to continue. In the terms used earlier, it could be said that the Warnock Report tried to change the discourse of special education from a medical to an educational one. It tried and failed for exactly the same reason that the discourse of care in the community failed; there are fundamentally incompatibilities between care and entitlements, between special and ordinary which make both provision and practice contemporaneously difficult and ultimately impossible. Testament to this are the personal experiences of 'special people' "All my life I have known that I was 'different' -special even -because that 'fact' has been brought home to me by the reactions of people around me. They either go out of their way to be nice to me, ignore me, or go out of their way to be awful to me, and it took me a long, long time to realise that these reactions were not necessarily to do with the kind of person I was, rather with what people assumed I was". (Gradwell 1992.17) Further, it has been argued that this change to a discourse of the special has also failed at the policy level because "The phrase 'special educational needs', for example, frequently justifies the separation of disabled children from non-disabled children into segregated special schools". (Barnes 1993.8) Before going on to talk about the political implications of this, there is one further point needs to be made explicitly to be against the discourse of caring in welfare or special needs in educational provision is not to be against caring or against welfare or against education. It is to argue that such discourses are an inappropriate basis to develop a proper discourse of welfare provision and professional practice and that the language of the special is an inappropriate basis to develop a proper discourse about schools and teaching. 5. Politics and the power of language Politics is not just about voting, every so often but at the micro-level it is about the exercise of power in a range of personal and social relationships. As far as I am aware there have been no empirical studies of the micro-politics of the discourse of the special in education, but there has been an important study of discourse in probation practice. It asserts that "Language is fundamental to the work of probation officers, whose task is to extract the 'truth' surrounding criminal behaviour from a number of sources including the defendant, other social workers, official records, reports, the medical profession and the police. From this variety of different and competing discourses, an official explanation of offending is assembled and a 'treatment' plan produced, which will have legitimacy in court. The linguistic rules of engagement require the probation officer to collate and translate explanations of unlawful behaviour into codes recognisable to official judicial bodies". (Denney 1992.135) In this Unit I have been asked not to set you any exercises but a few minutes rewriting the above quote as a special education rather than a probation discourse will illustrate the role that language can play in maintaining particulate sets of power relationships between professionals and their … The reason for the gap is to emphasise that we do not have a language which enables us to talk about such relationships in ways that are not structured by hierarchies and power: for example, doctor-patient; teacher-pupil; social worker-client; lecturer-student; and most recently provider-user. Denney, following post-modernist theorists, suggests that part of the solution to this problem is deconstruction. "The deconstruction of official discourse could provide the beginnings of a process that penetrates dominant and discriminatory conventions". (Denney 1992.135) But deconstruction may make the problem disappear altogether. Hart (1994), in an as yet unpublished study of special needs practice, draws attention to the position taken by the National Commission on Education (1993) that 'flexibility to respond to individual pupils' difficulties may in future prove more successful than maintaining a separate category of "special" need. While coming to the conclusion that maintaining the term 'special' is untenable, she warns "... that simply to dispense with a concept of 'special' education, now that the distinction has been acknowledged to be untenable, would not serve the best interests of children. The former distinction needs to be replaced by a new distinction of quite a different order, which will help to establish and articulate a convincing alternative to individual-deficit ways of conceptualising and pursuing concerns about children's learning" . (Hart 1994.270) What this is drawing attention to is the inescapable fact that language and its use is not just a semantic issue; as has already been argued, it is a political issue as well. And a political issue at the macro-level. Probably the best example of the macropolitics of language is the struggle of deaf people over the centuries to keep their own (sign) language alive. Ladd (1990.10) refers to this as 'a battle between cultures that has parallel in those battles with aboriginal and other native cultures'. In a recent contribution to the debate between the World Health Organisation and organisations of disabled people over their international classification scheme (Wood 1980), I make a similar point about the macro-politics of language, trying to draw parallels between the struggles of disabled people to control the language that is used to describe and classify us, with similar struggles by other oppressed groups. "The imposition of colonial languages on the natives, Oxford English on the regions, sexist language on women, racist language on black people, spoken language on deaf people, and so on, are all forms of cultural domination. Pidgin, dialects, slang, anti- sexist and anti-racist language and sign language are not, therefore, quaint and archaic forms of language use but forms of cultural resistance". (Oliver 1989) One final point needs to be made about the political function of language. It is not enough to realise that language is a political issue simply in an overt sense of the word. Politics as the exercise of power is sometimes as much about keeping things off the political agenda as it is about ensuring that they are debated (Lukes 1974). Thus the point about language is that it may sometimes serve to obscure or mystify issues - even the language rights as Hall graphically reminds us "... the language of rights is frequently deployed to obscure and mystify this fundamental basis which rights have in the struggle between contending social forces. It constantly abstracts rights from their real historical and social context, ascribes them a timeless universality, speaks of them as if they were 'given' rather than won and as if they were given once-and-for-all, rather than having to be constantly secured". (Hall 1979.8) Hall is also making the important point that rights are never one for all time; women and gay men and lesbians have seen some of their legal rights disappear in recent years and many women would argue that their social rights to use public transport after dark no longer exist. The discourse of rights, both human and civil, has played a major role in disability politics in recent years and this requires us to broaden our understanding of the issues in fundamental ways. To begin with, our current segregative practices and segregated provision, which continue to dominate the education of disabled children, have to be seen for what they are; the denial of rights to disabled people in just the same way as others are denied their rights in other parts of the world. As I wrote in a review of a recent re-appraisal of special education. "The lessons of history through the segregation of black people in the United States and current struggles to end segregation in South Africa have shown this to be so. To write as if segregation in schools, or from public transport systems or from public spaces or inter-personal interactions in our own society is somehow different, is to de- politicise the whole issue ". (Oliver 1991) What is both interesting and unfortunate about the integration/segregation discourse in the area of education however, has been its narrowness, both in terms of its failure to see integration as anything other than a technical debate about the quality of educational provision. Its failure to explicitly develop any connections with other debates about segregation of, for example, disabled from public transportation systems, of black people in South Africa, of blind people from public information, or of the poor from major parts of our cities, has been a major omission. An important reason for this is that legislation, as a concept, has been taken over by politicians, policy makers, professionals and academics, who have discussed and debated it, divorced from the views of disabled people themselves. Even my own discipline of sociology, which has a justifiable reputation for criticising everything in sight including itself, has focused little on the exclusion of disabled people from society and its institutions (Oliver 1990).

**Ableist and Disability rhetoric must constantly be problematized to stop the hierarchal binary orderings that the discourse creates.**

**Campbell 2003** *(Fiona Anne, , 2003, “The Great Divide: Ableism and Technologies of Disability Production”, Dissertation,* [*http://eprints.qut.edu.au/15889/1/Fiona\_Campbell\_Thesis.pdf*](http://eprints.qut.edu.au/15889/1/Fiona_Campbell_Thesis.pdf)*, accessed 6/29/12, JK)*

Like many other themes within social theory, ‘disability’ as a signifier may be understood in terms of catachresis13. That is, there is no literal referent for this concept, for as my thesis will demonstrate, as soon as we discursively interrogate ‘disability’, its meaning loses its fixity, generality and ultimately collapses14. However, terminology as discourse is important and requires certain justifications, clarifications and elaborations. Throughout this thesis, I have intentionally used the neologisms ‘disabled body’, ‘disabled subject’, ‘disabled citizen’, ‘referentially disabled’, as a way of reframing ontological positions of ‘disability’. From this perspective, I argue that the citation ‘disability’ invokes a reading of corporeal differences, particularities, and unintelligibilities within the context of culturally delineated normative and ableist (benchmark) bodies. In this way I argue that the signifier ‘disability’ is always in need of problematisation – it is a conceptual formation that is highly contextual, historical, contestable, multiple, changeable and fluid. Rather than maintaining a notion of ‘disability’ as a mere difference that may by default valorise the subject15, thus instilling hierarchical and binary orderings, disabled subjectifications when situated within poststructuralist traditions explain the inscribing and marking of those bodies from the viewpoint of an analytics of power. So, like sexed and radicalised bodies, the once ‘inessential’ body of the ‘disabled’ subject within critical social theory can be inserted into the continuum of subordination and the art of government in neo-liberalism. The ‘disabled body’, then refers to the figuring and representation of bodies deemed intolerable or ambiguous. Central to this signification is the materiality and embodiment of ‘disability’, in which incogitant assumptions concerning bodily difference bring an ontology of ‘disability’ into existence. One should not confuse the use of such terminology with ‘real’ people with disabilities and the subject positions in which our identities are constituted. Another concern is the question of how we are to ‘name’ privileged subject positions in ways that foreground dimensions of agency without falling into developing power elite theories. In other words, how do we talk about ‘who’ is doing what to ‘whom’? In her discussion about the boundaries of normativity, Thomson (1997a: 8) introduces the notion of the ‘normate’ to designate “the social figure through which people can represent themselves as definitive human beings” and uses the ideas of Erving Goffman (1986; 1990) to profile the type of individuals fitting such a subject position. The effects of a ‘normate’ designation are problematic. Thomson’s theorization conflates a ‘severely ableist’ disposition with the privileged speaking position of what she calls ‘normates’. But this rendering is misleading, for not all severely ableist individuals can be deemed privileged ‘normates’. Ableism also infects the sexed, classed and radicalised bodies of those anchored on the periphery and are not merely restricted to those within the socalled ‘normate’ profile. I argue that Margaret Thornton’s neologism of the ‘benchmark’ is more theoretically tenable because of its conceptual linking of subjectivity with power. According to Thornton (1996: 2), a ‘benchmark’ is used to delineate a hegemonic viewpoint that coincides with the interests of white, middle class, heterosexual, ableist men. Such hegemonic views project a particular way of seeing the world and certain figurations of the body as ‘natural’, as species typical functioning.

#### Language shapes reality – evaluating the meanings behind the words of an action is a priori to the action

**Edelman 85** (Murray Edelman. American political scientist in University of Wisconsin. “Political Language and Political Reality”. American Political Science Association. Winter 1985. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/418800?seq=1&uid=3739560&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21102185169611)//JuneC//

The most incisive twentieth century students of language converge from different premises on the conclusion that language is the key creator of the social worlds people experience, and they agree as well that language cannot usefully be understood as a tool for describing an objective reality. For the later Wittgenstein there are no essences, only language games. Chomsky analyzes the sense in which grammar is generative. For Derrida all language is performative, a form of action that undermines its own presuppositions. Foucault sees language as antedating and constructing subjectivity. The "linguistic turn" in twentieth century philosophy, social psychology, and literary theory entails an intellectual ferment that raises fundamental questions about a great deal of mainstream political science, and especially about its logical positivist premises. While the writersjust mentioned analyze various senses in which language use is an aspect of creativity, those who focus upon specifically political language are chiefly concerned with its capacity to reflect ideology, mystify, and distort. The more perspicacious of them deny that an undistorting language is possible in a social world marked by inequalities in resources and status, though the notion of an undistorted language can be useful as an evocation of an ideal benchmark. The emphasis upon political language as distorting or mystifying is a key theme in Lasswell and Orwell, as it is in Habermas, Osgood, Ellul, Vygotsky, Enzensberger, Bennett, and Shapiro. The critical element in political maneuver for advantage is the creation of meaning: the construction of beliefs about the significance of events, of problems, of crises of policy changes, and of leaders. The strategic need is to immobilize opposition and mobilize support. While coercion and intimidation help to check resistance in all political systems, the key tactic must always be the evocation of meanings that legitimize favored courses of action and threaten or reassure people so as to encourage them to be supportive or to remain quiescent. Allocations of benefits must themselves be infused with meanings. Whose well being does a policy threaten and whose does it enhance? lt is language about political events and developments that people experience; even events that are close by take their meaning from the language used to depict them. So political language is political reality; there is no other so far as the meaning of events to actor and spectators is concerned.

**Ableism is a pre-requisite to all oppression**

**Wolbring '08** Gregor Wolbring, Associate Professor Community Rehabilitation and Disability Studies, Past President of Canadian Disability Studies Association and member of the board of the Society for Disability Studies (USA), The politics of Ableism, June 2008,

http://secure.gvsu.edu/cms3/assets/3B8FF455–E590–0E6C–3ED0F895A6FBB287/the\_politics\_of\_ableism.pdf

Ableism is an umbrella ism for other isms such as racism, sexism, casteism, ageism, speciesism, anti–environmentalism, gross domestic product (GDP)–ism and consumerism. One can identify many different forms of Ableism such as biological structure–based Ableism (B), cognition–based Ableism (C), social structure–based Ableism (S) and Ableism inherent to a given economic system (E). ABECS could be used as the Ableism equivalent to the NBICS S&T convergence (Wolbring,2007e).